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We study the behavior of U.S. markets both before and after U.S. Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) meetings, and show that the announcement of a U.S. Federal Reserve rate change causes
a financial shock, where the dynamics after the announcement is described by an analogue of the
Omori earthquake law. We quantify the rate n(t) of aftershocks following an interest rate change at
time T , and find power-law decay which scales as n(t−T ) ∼ (t−T )−Ω, with Ω positive. Surprisingly,
we find that the same law describes the rate n′(|t−T |) of “pre-shocks” before the interest rate change
at time T . This is the first study to quantitatively relate the size of the market response to the news
which caused the shock and to uncover the presence of quantifiable preshocks. We demonstrate
that the news associated with interest rate change is responsible for causing both the anticipation
before the announcement and the surprise after the announcement. We estimate the magnitude of
financial news using the relative difference between the U. S. Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds
Effective rate. Our results are consistent with the “sign effect,” in which “bad news” has a larger
impact than “good news.” Furthermore, we observe significant volatility aftershocks, confirming a
“market underreaction” that lasts at least 1 trading day.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Interest rate changes by the Federal Reserve provide
a significant perturbation to financial markets, which we
analyze from the perspective of statistical physics [1–6].
The Federal Reserve board (Fed), in charge of monetary
policy as the central bank of the United States, is one
of the most influential financial institutions in the world.
During Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meet-
ings, the Fed determines whether or not to change key
interest rates. These interest rates serve as a bench-
mark and a barometer for both American and inter-
national economies. The publicly released statements
from the scheduled FOMC meetings provide grounds for
widespread speculation in financial markets, often with
significant consequences.
In this paper, we show that markets respond sharply
to FOMC news in a complex way reminiscent of physical
earthquakes described by the Omori law [7, 8]. For finan-
cial markets, the Omori law was first observed in market
crashes by Lillo and Mantegna [9], followed by a further
study of Weber et al. [10], which found the same behav-
ior in medium-sized aftershocks. However, the market
crash is only an extreme example of information flow in
financial markets. This paper extends the Omori law
observed in large financial crises to the more common
Federal Reserve announcements, and suggests that large
market news dissipates via power-law relaxation (Omori
law) of the volatility. In addition to the standard Omori
dynamics following the announcement, we also find novel
Omori dynamics before the announcement.
The market dynamics following the release of FOMC
news are consistent with previous studies of price-
discovery in foreign exchange markets following marcroe-
conomic news releases [11, 12]. Furthermore, we hypoth-
esize that the uncertainty in Fed actions, coupled with
the pre-announced schedule of FOMC meetings, can in-
crease speculation among market traders, which can lead
to the observed market underreaction [13]. Market un-
derreaction, meaning that markets take a finite time to
readjust prices following news, is not consistent with the
efficient market hypothesis; Several theories have been
proposed to account for this phenomena [14].
We analyze all 66 scheduled FOMC meetings in
the eight-year period 2000-2008 using daily data from
http://finance.yahoo.com. Also, for the two-year pe-
riod 2001-2002, we analyze the intraday behavior for 19
FOMC meetings using Trades And Quote (TAQ) data on
the 1-minute time scale.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II we
describe the FOMC meetings and the Fed interest rate
relevant to our analysis. In Section IIIA we analyze the
response of the S&P100, the top 100 stocks (ranked by
12-month sales according to a 2002 BusinessWeek report)
belonging to the 2002 S&P 500 index, over the 2000-2008
period using daily data. Using the relative spread be-
tween the 6-Month Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds
Effective rate, we relate the speculation prior to the
FOMC meetings to the daily market volatility, measured
here as the logarithmic difference between the intraday
high and low price for a given stock on the day of the
announcement. In Section III B we study high-frequency
intraday TAQ data on the 1-min scale for the S&P100,
and find an Omori law with positive exponent immedi-
ately following the announcement of Fed rate changes.
Further, we relate the intraday market response, (quanti-
fied by both the Omori exponent and Omori amplitude),
to the change in market expectations before and after the
announcement.
2II. FOMC MEETINGS, FED INTEREST RATES
AND TREASURY BILLS
There are many economic indicators that determine
the health of the U.S. economy. In turn, the health of the
U.S. economy sets a global standard due to the ubiquity
of both the U.S. dollar and the economic presence main-
tained through imports, exports, and the Global Mar-
ket [15]. The U.S. Federal Reserve Target rate, along
with the Effective “overnight” rate, set the scale for in-
terest rates in the United States and abroad. The Target
rate is determined at FOMC meetings, which are sched-
uled throughout the year, with detailed minutes publicly
released from these meetings. The Effective rate is a
“weighted average of rates on brokered trades” between
the Fed and large banks and financial institutions, and
is a market realization of the Target rate [16]. In Fig. 1
we plot the Federal interest rates over the 8-year period
2000-2008.
Our analysis focuses on the FOMC meetings after Jan-
uary 2000. Historically, the methods for releasing the
meeting details have varied. In the 1990s, there was a
transition from a very secretive policy towards the cur-
rent transparent policy [17]. Since the year 2000, the Fed
has released statements detailing the views and goals of
the FOMC. This increase in public information has led
to an era of mass speculation in the markets, revolving
mainly around key economic indicators such as the un-
employment rate, the Consumer Price Index, the money
supply, etc. These economic indicators also influence the
FOMC in their decision to either change or maintain key
interest rates. As a result of this open policy, the Fed
has used the “announcement effect” [19] to manipulate
the federal funds market. Speculation has assumed many
forms and new heights, evident in the implementation of
new types of derivatives based on federal securities. For
instance, options and futures are available at the Chicago
Board of Trade which are based on Federal Funds, Trea-
sury Bills, and Eurodollar foreign exchange. These con-
tracts can be used to estimate the implied probability
of interest rate changes, utilizing sophisticated methods
focussed on the price movement of expiring derivative
contracts [18, 20–24].
In the next section, we outline a simple method to
measure speculation prior to a scheduled FOMC meeting
using the 6-Month Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds
Effective (“overnight”) rate. These data are readily avail-
able and are updated frequently at the website of the
Federal Reserve [16]. Because each FOMC meeting is
met with speculation (in the weeks before the meeting)
and anticipation (in the hours before the announcement),
we identify the decision to change or not to change key
interest rates as a market perturbation. The market re-
sponse results from the systematic stress associated with
the speculation and anticipation, which are not always in
line with the FOMC decision.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Response to FOMC Meetings on Daily Time
Scale
In this section we analyze the daily activity before and
after 66 scheduled FOMC meetings over the 8-year pe-
riod 2000-2008, where scheduled meetings are publicly
announced at least a year in advance [16]. We do not
consider unscheduled meetings resulting in rate change,
which contain an intrinsic element of surprise, and are
historically infrequent (only 4 unexpected Target rate
changes over the same period). Of primary importance, is
the FOMC committee’s decision to change or not change
the Target rate R(t) by some percent ∆R(t), where the
absolute relative change |∆R(t)/R(t − 1)| has typically
filled the range between 0.0 and 0.25. This section serves
as an initial motivation for the intraday analysis, and
will also serve as a guide in developing a metric that
captures market speculation. In this section we use the
intraday high-low price range to quantify the magnitude
of price fluctuations. In particular, we analyze the com-
panies belonging to the S&P 100, and also the subset of
18 banking and finance companies referred to here as the
“Bank” sector.
In Fig. 1(a) we plot T (t), the time series for the 6-
Month Treasury Bill, along with F (t), the Federal Funds
Effective rate, and R(t), the Federal Funds Target rate,
over the 8-year period beginning in January 2000. The
relative difference between the 6-Month Treasury Bill and
the Federal Funds Effective rate is an indicator of the fu-
ture expectations of the Federal Funds Target rate [17].
Note that the 6-Month Treasury Bill has anticipatory
behavior with respect to the Federal Funds Target (and
hence Effective) rates. Other more sophisticated mod-
els utilize futures on Federal Funds and Eurodollar ex-
change, but these markets are rather new, and represent
the highly complex nature of contemporary markets and
hedging programs [18, 20–24]. Hence, we use a simple
and intuitive method for estimating market speculation
and anticipation by analyzing the relative difference be-
tween the 6-Month Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds
Effective rate.
Fig. 1(b) exhibits the typical interplay between the 6-
Month T-Bill and the Federal Funds Effective rate be-
fore and after a FOMC meeting. The change in the
value of the Effective rate results from market specula-
tion, starting approximately one trading week (5 trading
days) prior to the announcement. This change follows
from the forward-looking Treasury Bill, which in the ex-
ample in Fig. 1(b), is priced above the Federal Funds rate
even 15 trading days before the announcement.
In order to quantify speculation and anticipation in
the market prior to each scheduled FOMC meeting, we
analyze the time series δ(t) of the relative spread between
3F (t) and T (t),
δ(t) ≡ ln
(F (t)
T (t)
)
. (1)
As an example of this relation, in Fig. 1(c) we plot δ(t) for
the 15 days before and after a typical FOMC meeting re-
sulting in a rate change. In order to study the speculation
preceding the ith scheduled FOMC meeting, we calculate
the average relative spread over the L1 = 15 day period.
We weight the days in the L1-day period leading up to
the FOMC meeting day exponentially, such that the rela-
tive spread on the ∆tth day before the announcement has
the weight w(∆t) = e−∆t/λ. Without loss of generality,
we choose the value of λ = 10 days corresponding to two
trading weeks [25]. We define the speculation metric,
Θi = δ(t)i ≡
∑
∆t δ(ti −∆t)w(∆t)∑
∆t w(∆t)
, (2)
which is a weighted average of δ(t) before the announce-
ment, where the sums are computed over the range
∆t ∈ [1, L1]. The metric Θi for the i
th FOMC meeting
can be positive or negative, depending on the market’s
forward-looking expectations.
In order to quantify the market response to the spec-
ulation Θi, we analyze the market volatility around each
FOMC meeting. For a particular stock around the ith
scheduled FOMC meeting, we take the daily high price
phi(ti + ∆t), and the daily low price plow(ti + ∆t), for
∆t ∈ [−20, 20], where ∆t = 0 corresponds to ti, the day
of the meeting. We then compute the high-low range for
each trading day,
r(ti +∆t) ≡ ln
( phi(ti +∆t)
plow(ti +∆t)
)
. (3)
For each stock and each meeting, we scale the range by
〈r〉, the average range over the 41-day time sequence
centered around the meeting day, resulting in the nor-
malized volatility v(ti + ∆t) ≡ r(ti + ∆t)/〈r〉. Simi-
larly, we use Φ(ti + ∆t), the time series for the volume
traded over the same period, to compute a weight for each
stock corresponding to the normalized volume on the
day of the FOMC meeting. We calculate this weight as
φi ≡ Φ(ti)/〈Φ〉i, where 〈Φ〉i is the average daily volume
over the 41-day time sequence centered around the ith
meeting day. We use a volume weight in order to empha-
size the price-impact resulting from relatively high trad-
ing volume, since there are significant cross-correlations
between volume change and price change [26]. Finally,
we compute the weighted average volatility time series
over all stocks and all meetings,
〈v(∆t)〉 ≡
∑
v(ti +∆t)φi∑
φi
. (4)
In Fig. 2 we plot the trend of average daily volatility
defined in Eq. (4) for the 10 days before and after the
scheduled announcements.
We observe a peak in 〈v(∆t)〉 on FOMC meeting days,
corresponding to ∆t = 0, with a more pronounced peak
in the bank sector (Fig. 2). Stocks in the bank sector
are strongly impacted by changes in Fed rates, which im-
mediately influence both their holding and lending rates.
On average there is a 15-20% increase in volatility on
days corresponding to FOMC meetings.
In order to quantify the impact of a single FOMC
announcement on day ti, we define the average market
volatility
Vi = 〈v(ti)〉 ≡
∑(i)
v(ti)φi∑(i) φi . (5)
Here, 〈· · ·〉i and
∑(i)
refer to the average and sum over
records corresponding only to the day ti. Again, φi ≡
Φ(ti)/〈Φ〉 is a normalized weight, where now 〈Φ〉 is the
average daily volume over the entire 8-year period, since
we compare many meetings across a large time span.
In Fig. 3 we plot the average volatility Vi of the (a)
S&P100 and (b) the subset of 18 banking stocks versus
Θi. For negative values of Θi, for which T (t) > F (t)
corresponding to an expected rate increase, we observe a
less volatile market response. Conversely, for larger pos-
itive values of Θi, for which T (t) < F (t) corresponding
to a rate cut, there tends to be larger market fluctua-
tions. Hence, the market responds differently to falling
and rising rates, where the direction in rate change often
reflects the overall health of the economy as viewed by the
FOMC. Typically, the FOMC implements rate increases
to fight inflation, whereas rate decreases often follow bad
economic news or economic emergency. Hence, our find-
ings are consistent with the empirical “sign effect”, in
which “bad” news has a greater impact in markets than
does “good” news [12]. Furthermore, there is also a ten-
dency for large average volatility even when Θi is small,
possibly stemming from the extreme surprise characteris-
tic of some FOMC decisions. In these cases, more sophis-
ticated methods are needed to improve the predictions of
market movement.
B. Intraday response to FOMC decision via an
Omori Law
In the previous section we studied the market response
on the daily scale. Now we ask the question, “What is the
intraday response to FOMC news?” Here we analyze the
TAQ data over the 2-year period Jan. 1, 2001 to Dec. 31,
2002. The reported times for the FOMC announcement
are listed in Table 1 [27]. Inspired by the non-stationary
nature of financial time series, methods have been devel-
oped within the framework of non-equilibrium statistical
mechanics to describe phenomena ranging from volatility
clustering [28–30] to financial correlation matrices [31–
33].
We use the Omori law, originally proposed in 1894 to
describe the relaxation of after-shocks following earth-
4quakes, to describe the response of the market to FOMC
announcements. Defined in Ref. [9], the Omori law quan-
tifies the rate n(t) of large volatility events following a
singular perturbation at time T . The shock may be ex-
ogenous (resulting from external news stimuli) or endoge-
nous (resulting from internal correlations, e.g. “herding
effect”) [34–38]. This rate is defined as,
n(|t− T |) ∼ |t− T |−Ω , (6)
where Ω is the Omori power-law exponent.
Here we study the rate of events greater than a volatil-
ity threshold q, using the high-frequency intraday price
time series p(t). The intraday volatility (absolute re-
turns) is expressed as v(t) ≡ | ln(p(t)/p(t − δt))|, where
we use δt = 1 minute. To compare stocks, we scale each
raw time series in terms of the standard deviation over
the entire period analyzed, and then remove the average
intraday trading pattern as described in Ref. [10]. This
establishes a common volatility threshold q, in units of
standard deviation, for all stocks analyzed.
In the analysis that follows, we focus on N(|t − T |),
the cumulative number of events above threshold q,
N(|t− T |) =
∫ t
T
n(|t′ − T |)dt′ ≡ β(|t− T |)1−Ω , (7)
which is less noisy compared to n(|t − T |). Using
N(|t − T |), we examine the intraday market dynamics
for 100 S&P stocks, before (t < T ) and after (t > T ) the
ith FOMC announcement at Ti, which typically occurs
at 2:15 PM ET (285 minutes after the opening bell) for
scheduled meetings.
In Figs. 4(a,b) we plot the average volatility response
N(t) of the S ≡ 100 stocks analyzed, where
N(t) ≡
1
S
S∑
j=1
N j(t) . (8)
This average is obtained by combining the individual
Omori responses, N j(t), of the S stocks. Such averag-
ing does not cancel the Omori law, but allows for bet-
ter statistical regression. This is especially useful for an
Omori law corresponding to large volatility threshold q,
where a single stock might not have a sufficient number
of events. In Fig. 4(c) we plot the trade pattern N j(t)
of Merrill Lynch on Tuesday 08/21/01, and also in Fig.
5 for the following three days, demonstrating that the
Omori relaxation can persists for several days.
The abrupt change in the curvature of N(t) illustrates
the volatility clustering which begins around the time of
the announcement T , corresponding to the vertical line
at t = 285 minutes in Figs. 4(a-c). For comparison, we
find that the average 〈N(t)〉 time series calculated from
all days without FOMC meetings is approximately lin-
ear with time throughout the entire day, indicating that
the sudden increase in excess volatility before and af-
ter announcement times T results from the FOMC news.
TABLE I: Reported times of market perturbations in the
form of FOMC news. Dates of 19 FOMC meetings in the
2-year period between Jan. 2001 - Dec. 2002, where the Fed-
eral Funds Target rate Rnew was implemented by the rate
change ∆R at T minutes after the opening bell at 9:30 AM
ET. The absolute relative change | ∆R
Rold
| ≡ |∆R(t)/R(t − 1)|
has typically filled the range between 0.0 and 0.25. Note:
Date** refers to unscheduledmeetings, in which the announce-
ment time did not correspond to 2:15 PM ET (T = 285
minutes)[27].
FOMC Date Rnew (%) ∆R
∆R
Rold
T
01/03/01** 6 -0.5 -0.077 210
01/31/01 5.5 -0.5 -0.083 285
03/20/01 5 -0.5 -0.091 285
04/18/01** 4.5 -0.5 -0.100 90
05/15/01 4 -0.5 -0.111 285
06/27/01 3.75 -0.25 -0.063 285
08/21/01 3.5 -0.25 -0.067 285
09/17/01** 3 -0.5 -0.143 0
10/02/01 2.5 -0.5 -0.167 285
11/06/01 2 -0.5 -0.200 285
12/11/01 1.75 -0.25 -0.125 285
01/30/02 1.75 0 0.00 285
03/19/02 1.75 0 0.00 285
05/07/02 1.75 0 0.00 285
06/26/02 1.75 0 0.00 285
08/13/02 1.75 0 0.00 285
09/24/02 1.75 0 0.00 285
11/06/02 1.25 -0.5 -0.286 285
12/10/02 1.25 0 0.00 285
Volatility clustering in financial data sampled at the 1-
minute scale persists for several months, with a signifi-
cant crossover in the observed power-law autocorrelations
occurring around 600 minutes (≈ 1.5 days) [39–41].
In order to compare the dynamics before and after the
announcement, we first separate the intraday time series
N(t) into two time series Nb(t|t < T ), and Na(t|t > T ).
Then, to treat the dynamics symmetrically around the
ith intraday announcement time Ti [38, 42], we define
the displaced time τ = |t − Ti| ≥ 1 as the temporal
distance from the minute Ti [43]. As an illustration, we
plot N(τ) in Fig. 6 for the 4 corresponding N(t) curves
exhibited in Fig. 4(a). We then employ a linear fit to
both Nb,i(τ) = Ni(Ti)−Ni(|t−Ti|) and Na,i(τ) = Ni(t−
Ti) − Ni(Ti) on a log-log scale to determine the Omori
power-law exponents Ωb before the news and Ωa after the
news. In analogy, we define the amplitude β before as βb
and after as βa, as defined in Eq. (7).
Typically Ωa > 0, which reflects the pronounced in-
crease in the rate of events above the volatility thresh-
5old q after the time of the announcement. We also ob-
serve Ω < 0, which corresponds to a time series in which
the pre-shocks or after-shocks farther away from the an-
nouncement (for large τ) are dominant over the volatil-
ity cascade around time τ ≈ 0. For comparison, n(τ) is
constant for stochastic processes with no memory, corre-
sponding to Ω ≡ 0. Hence, for an empirical value Ω ≈ 0,
the rate n(τ) is indistinguishable from an exponential de-
cay for τ < t, where t is the characteristic exponential
time scale. However, for larger values of Ω, the exponen-
tial and power-law response curves are distinguishable,
especially if several orders of magnitude in τ is available.
For all meetings analyzed, we find that Ω ≡ Ω(q)
increases with q, meaning that the relatively large af-
tershocks decay more quickly than the relatively small
aftershocks. Hence, the largest volatility values cluster
around the announcement time T . For comparison, Ω(q)
values are calculated in [9] using q = 4, 5, 6, 7 and in
[10] using q = 3, 4 for large financial crashes. For our
data set, the cumulative probability P (v > q) that a
given volatility value is greater than volatility threshold
q is P (v > 3) = 0.18 and P (v > 5) = 0.087. Further-
more, we reject the null hypothesis that q > 5 volatil-
ities are distributed evenly across all days, finding that
5% of the volatility values greater than q = 5 are found
on FOMC meeting days, whereas only 4% are expected
under the null hypothesis that large volatilities are dis-
tributed uniformly across all trading days. The 25% in-
crease for q = 5 indicates that FOMC meetings days are
more volatile than other days at the α ≈ 0 significance
level. We also observe that the amplitudes of the Omori
law generally obey the inequality βb < βa, resulting from
the large response immediately following the news.
Although we focus mainly on price volatility v(t) in
this paper, we also observe Omori dynamics in the high-
frequency volume time series ω(t), defined as the cumula-
tive number of shares traded in minute t. In Figs. 7 (a-d)
for the S&P 100 and Figs. 7 (e-h) for the bank sector, we
compare the average of Omori exponents Ωb and Ωa for
both volatility and volume dynamics, and for volatility
threshold value q = 3. We compute the average Omori
exponents using two averaging methods, the “individual”
method and the “portfolio” method.
To analyze the time series Na,i after the announce-
ment i, we first average the exponents Ωja obtained for
each individual stock j, yielding 〈Ωa〉. This “individ-
ual” method provides an error bar corresponding to the
sample standard deviation σ(Ωa). The second “portfo-
lio” method determines a single Ωa from N(t) in Eq. (8).
Comparing the open-box (individual method) and closed-
box (portfolio method) symbols in Fig. 7, we observe
that both methods yield approximately the same aver-
age value of Ωa. Note that for the subset i = {1,4,8}
of the unscheduled FOMC meetings, Ωa is smaller than
usual, capturing the intense activity following surprise
announcements. Hence, unexpected FOMC announce-
ments can produce an inverse Omori law exhibiting con-
vex relaxation (Ωa < 0) over a short horizon if the news
contains a large amount of inherent surprise. The 8th
meeting corresponds to the opening of the markets after
Sept. 11, 2001.
For the time series Nb,i before the announcement i,
individual stocks often do not have sufficient activity
to provide accurate power-law fits. Hence, to estimate
the sample standard deviation σ(Ωb), we produce partial
combinations, 〈N(τ)〉b,i ≡
1
M
∑M
j=1N
j
b,i(τ) using M ≡ 5.
We then compute a standard deviation σ(Ωb) from the
Ωb values calculated from 〈N(τ)〉b,i. The σ(Ωb) values
correspond to the error bars for 〈Ωb〉 in Fig. 7.
We also compute a single Ωb value from the portfolio
average Nb,i(τ), which corresponds to the limit M = S.
The values of Ωb using the two methods are consistent.
Interestingly, the values of Ωb calculated from volume
data are all close to zero. However, using the Student T-
test we reject the null hypothesis that each average value
〈Ωb〉 is equal to zero at the α = 0.01 significance level for
15 out of 17 dates.
Fig. 7 shows the range of Ω values for each of the 19
FOMC meetings we analyze. There are 8 panels com-
paring the Ω values (i) between the dynamics before and
after T , (ii) between the volatility and volume dynamics,
and (iii) between set of all stocks comprising the S&P100
and the set of stocks comprising the banking sector. We
hypothesize that the differences in the Omori Ω values,
before and after the announcement, are related to the
anticipation and perceived surprise of the FOMC news.
Furthermore, for the dynamics after the news, we find
anomalous negative Ωa values for two surprise FOMC
announcements i = 1 and i = 8. Also, we find that vol-
ume Ω values are more regular across all meeting events,
suggesting that volume and price volatility contain dis-
tinct market information [44, 45].
In order to find potential variations in the response
dynamics for different stock sectors, in Fig. 8(a) we com-
pare the Ωa values after the announcement for 5 ap-
proximately equal-sized sectors using volatility threshold
q = 3. We observe that the differences in the average
values of the sectors are fairly small, indicating a broad
market response. We also observe that the technology
sector (Tech.), composed of hardware, software, and IT
companies, often has the largest average Ωa value. Larger
exponents, which correspond to shorter relaxation times,
could result from the intense trading in the Tech sector
during the Tech/IT bubble, which peaked in the year
2000. In follow-up analysis, we find in [46] that stocks
with higher trading activity, quantified as the average
number of transactions per minute, have larger Ωj in
response to market shocks, and thus, faster price discov-
ery. In order to compare the variation in the individ-
ual values of Ωja, we plot the pdf of exponents for all
stocks and meetings in Fig. 8(b) using the shifted vari-
able xj ≡ Ωja,i − Ωa,i. We conclude from a Z-test at
the α = 0.0005 significance level that Tech sector Omori
exponents are larger on average, 〈x〉Tech > 〈x〉SP100.
Motivated by the metric Θi defined in Eq. (2), which
quantifies speculation and anticipation in the market pre-
6ceding FOMC meetings, we now develop a second metric
to describe surprise through the change in market specu-
lation following the announcement. This metric ∆i com-
pares the anticipation leading up to the announcement
with the revised speculation following the FOMC deci-
sion. This can be quantified through the relative change
in δ(t), which provides a rough measure of the market
stress that is released in the financial shock. Qualita-
tively, ∆i relates the average value of the spread before
and after the ith scheduled meeting. We define,
∆i ≡
(
δ(t)i,a − δ(t)i,b
)
× S(∆Ri) (9)
≡
(∑ δ(ti −∆t) w(∆t)∑
w(∆t)
−
∑
δ(ti +∆t) w(∆t)∑
w(∆t)
)
×S(∆Ri) ,
(10)
where the sum is computed over the range ∆t ∈ [1, L2]
trading days, with L2 = 15 trading days and λ2 =
10 trading days. The factor S(∆Ri) = 1 when the
Fed increases or maintains the Target rate R(t), while
S(∆Ri) = −1 when the Fed decreases the Target rate.
In Figs. 9 (a-d) we relate the amplitudes 〈βb〉 and
〈βa〉, and also the exponents 〈Ωb〉 and 〈Ωb〉 to the spec-
ulation metric Θ and the surprise metric ∆. We observe
that larger Θ and larger ∆ are related to larger ampli-
tude 〈βb〉 quantifying the preshock dynamics. However,
we do not find a statistically significant relation between
Θ or ∆ and the aftershock parameters, suggesting that
the relaxation dynamics following FOMC news are less
predictable. Nevertheless, the aftershock dynamics are
consistently more pronounced, with 〈βa〉 > 〈βb〉. We
interpret Figs. 9(a) and (c) as follows: when Θ < 0,
corresponding to “good” market sentiment and possi-
ble rate increase, the dynamics before the announcement
have small βb and small Ωb reflecting low activity. Af-
ter the announcement, the values of βa and Ωa increase,
corresponding to a fast response of medium size. In the
case of Θ > 0, corresponding to “bad” market sentiment
resulting from speculation of a rate cut, the dynamics
before the announcement have large βb and large Ωb,
corresponding to a strong but quick buildup of volatil-
ity. After the announcement, the dynamics have large
βa and small Ωa, corresponding to a strong and lasting
relaxation dynamics. The interpretation of Figs. 9(b)
and (d) is similar to the interpretation of Figs. 9(a) and
(c), in that both surprise (∆ > 0) and expected (∆ ≈ 0)
bad news, correspond to a stronger and longer-lasting
relaxation dynamics.
IV. DISCUSSION
Information flows through various technological av-
enues, keeping the ever-changing world up-to-date. All
news carries some degree of surprise, where the perceived
magnitude of the news certainly depends on the recipient.
In financial markets, where speculation on investment
returns results annually in billions of dollars in trans-
actions, news plays a significant role in perturbing the
complex financial system both on large and small scales,
reminiscent of critical behavior with divergent correlation
lengths [47]. Perturbations to the financial system are
easily transmitted throughout the market by the long-
range interactions that are found in the networks of mar-
ket correlations [31–33]. Afterwards, the effects of the
perturbation may persist via the long-term memory ob-
served in volatility time series [39–41], with fluctuation
scaling obeying the emperical Taylor’s law [48, 49].
We have shown that the Omori law describes the dis-
sipation of information following the arrival of Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) news. This type of
relaxation is consistent with the substructure of financial
crash aftershocks observed on various scales [10]. In par-
ticular, we systematically study the dynamical response
of the stock market to perturbative information in the
form of a Federal Reserve FOMC interest rate announce-
ments, which can be expected (scheduled) or unexpected
(as in cases of emergency).
In the case of unexpected news, as in Fig. 4(d), a
pronounced response may result from reduced market
liquidity, since traders do not have ample time to pre-
pare and adjust [12]. Our findings suggest that the dy-
namics of “rallies” based on other forms of news, such
as earning reports, upgrades and downgrades of stocks
by major financial firms, unemployment reports, merg-
ing announcements etc., might also be governed by the
Omori law with parameters that depend on the type of
news. The impact of macroeconomic news has been ana-
lyzed for foreign exchange markets [12], where it is found
that high levels of volatility are present following both
scheduled and surprise news.
According to the efficient market hypothesis [14], the
time scale over which news is incorporated into prices
should be very small. However, consistent with previous
studies, we find “market underreaction” [13] evident in
the finite time scale (found here to be at least 1 trading
day) over which the volatility aftershocks are significant.
Moreover, we quantify the dynamics before and after, and
show that the Omori parameters are related to investor
sentiment [13], here measured by comparing the 6-month
the Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds rates.
It is also conceivable that Omori law decay of market
aftershocks also exists in the traded volume time series
and the bid-ask spread time series [42, 50] . Recently,
Joulin et al. [36] use a similar method to describe the re-
laxation of trading following news streaming from feeds
such as Dow Jones and Reuters, and compare to the re-
laxation following anomalous volatility jumps. Joulin et
al. [36] also find Omori law relaxation, with exponent
Ωa ≈ 1 following a news source, and Ωa ≈ 0.5 following
an endogenous jump; interestingly, they find that the am-
plitude of the Omori law is larger for news sources than
for endogenous jumps. For further comparison, Weber et
al. [10] find Ωa ≈ 0.69 for the 38 days following the mar-
ket crash on September 11, 1986. One distinct difference
7between these studies, is the source of the news: Joulin
et al. pool together thousands of news sources, some pos-
sibly pertaining to only a single stock; we focus on one
particular type of news, the FOMC Target rate decision,
which has a broad impact on the whole market and econ-
omy. It is possible that the difference between anticipated
news and idiosyncratic news is the important criterion to
consider when analyzing market response functions in re-
lation to exogenous events. Here, we find novel dynamics
before anticipated announcements.
In the case of FOMC news, speculation can be quan-
tified by measuring the relative difference between the
effective Federal Funds rate and the Treasury Bill in the
weeks leading up to a scheduled meeting. We develop a
speculation metric, Θ, and relate it to V , the volatility on
the day of the meetings, finding that the market behaves
more erratically when the Treasury Bill predicts a de-
crease in the Federal Funds Target rate. A rate decrease
often occurs in response to economic shocks, whereas a
rate increase is often used to fight inflation. Hence, the
asymmetric response in Fig. 3 to rising and falling rates is
consistent with the “sign effect”, where it has been found
that bad news causes a larger market reaction than good
news [12], and that the asymmetry may result from the
increased uncertainty in expectations among traders.
We analyze the four Omori-law parameters Ωb, Ωa, βb
and βa calculated for 19 FOMC meetings. We conjecture
that the Omori-law parameters are related to the mar-
ket’s speculation, anticipation and surprise on the day
of the FOMC meeting. In order to quantify speculation
of rate cuts and rate increases, we define the measure
Θ, which is the relative spread between the Treasury Bill
and the Federal Funds rates, before the meeting. In order
to quantify surprise, we develop ∆, which measures the
change in the relative spread between the Treasury Bill
and the Federal Funds rates, before and after the meet-
ing. We relate both Θ and ∆ to the dynamical response
of the market on the day of the meeting. We find that
relatively small Ω values and relatively large amplitude
β values, corresponding to longer relaxation time and
large response, follow from “bad” news, as in the case of
the market reaction to the World Trade Center attacks
in 2001. In all, these results show that markets relax
according to the Omori law following large crashes and
Federal interest rate changes, suggesting that the pertur-
bative response of markets belongs to a universal class of
Omori laws, independent of the magnitude of news.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) An illustration of the close relation between the Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds rate. (a) Time
series of the Federal Reserve Target rate, R(t), and the Federal Reserve Effective rate, F (t), for Federal Funds (F.F.) dating
from Jan. 2000 to Apr. 2008. The 6-Month Treasury Bill, T (t), closely follows the effective rate, with speculation about future
changes causing deviations in the relative values. United States Treasury Bills carry little risk, and are considered to be one
of the most secure investments. (b) A typical illustration of the Federal Funds Effective rate and the Treasury Bill, where
both gravitate around the Federal Funds Target rate. The change in the relative spread δ(t), defined in Eq. (1), between the
Treasury bill and the Federal Funds Effective rate, indicates changes in market speculation. (c) The relative spread, δ(t), 15
days before and 15 days after the scheduled FOMC meeting on Dec. 14, 2004, which corresponds to ∆t = 0. Note that the
average value of the relative spread increases after the announcement, indicating a shift in market consensus and speculation.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Average daily volatility trend defined in Eq. (4) exhibits increased market volatility on the day of
FOMC meetings, corresponding to ∆t = 0. “Bank” refers to the portfolio of 18 stocks that belong to the S&P100. There is a
15-20% increase in volatility on days corresponding to FOMC meetings. Standard deviation σ(v(∆t)) ≈ 0.4 can be assigned to
each data point in the time series, and are calculated by randomizing the daily volatility time series of each company. (Inset)
Probability density function (pdf) of normalized volatility v ≡ r(t)/〈r〉, where the quantity r(t) ≡ ln(phi(t)/plow(t)) is the
range of the price time series of a given stock for a particular day. We plot the pdf of volatility values for the S&P100 on the
set of days with FOMC meetings and for the set of all “other” days. The distributions are approximately log-normal, with
a shift towards higher average volatility on FOMC days. The average values for the two data sets are 〈v〉FOMC = 1.12 and
〈v〉other = 1.00.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Demonstration of the relation between speculation of interest rate change and market volatility in the
S&P100 and for the subset of Banking stocks. We relate Θi, the speculation in the market before a FOMC meeting defined
in Eq. (2), to the market volatility Vi defined in Eq. (5). A large absolute value of Θi reflects the high probability that an
interest rate change will happen. Interestingly, there are many instances where Θi ≈ 0, followed by large volatility. These
values correspond to FOMC decisions to maintain interest rate levels (∆R = 0), and suggest a fundamental difference in the
dynamics following decisions to change versus decisions not change the Federal Funds Target rate. Also, there is an underlying
symmetry in ∆R, since in the case of either a rate increase or a rate decrease, the FOMC also has the option of no increase.
Hence, ∆R = 0 can occur as either “good” or “bad” news, whereas typically decisions of ∆R > 0 reflect situations with positive
market sentiment whereas decisions of ∆R < 0 reflect situations with negative market sentiment. Hence, the asymmetry in
market volatility is consistent with the “sign effect” [12]. Although the correlation between Θi and Vi is dominated by residual
error, it is nevertheless supporting that the regression captures the crossover at (θ, V ) = (0, 1). Including all data points, the
regression correlation coefficient is r2 = 0.34, and the slope of the regression is m = 0.36± 0.13 for panel (a) and r2 = 0.30 and
m = 0.54 ± 0.22 for panel (b). Restricting data points corresponding only to interest rate changes (red and green triangles),
r2 = 0.48 and m = 0.37 ± 0.12 for panel (a) and r2 = 0.40 and m = 0.53 ± 0.21 for panel (b) (this second regression is not
shown and is indistinguishable from the regression including all data points). All linear regressions pass the ANOVA (analysis
of variance) F-test, rejecting the null hypothesis that m = 0 at the α = 0.05 significance level.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The cumulative volatility time series N(t) demonstrates Omori-law response dynamics, here in response
to FOMC announcements occurring at the time T indicated by a vertical solid red line. The abrupt change in the curvature
of N(t) around time t ≈ T illustrates the increased volatility caused by the announcement. The significant aftershocks which
occur until the end of the trading day are consistent with “market underreaction” [11, 12]. Market underreaction and other
market inefficiencies can result from increased levels of uncertainty among traders following market news [13]. Each time series
N(t) is calculated for a given volatility threshold q, where larger q values correspond to N(t) curves with smaller amplitude
(smaller rate of large volatility events). Panels (a,b,c) illustrate the dynamics around a scheduled announcement made at
T = 285 minutes (2:15 PM ET). For the S&P 100, we calculate N(t) on 05/15/01 for (a) 1-minute volatility and (b) 1-minute
total volume using Eq. (8). (c) We calculate N j(t) for Merrill Lynch (MER) on 08/21/01. (d) The Omori law also occurs for
unscheduled FOMC announcements, as illustrated for the Bank sector N(t) on 04/18/01, when the surprise rate change was
announced at T = 90 minutes (11:00 AM ET), resulting in raised levels of volatility throughout the entire trading day. For
panels (a-d), the dashed red lines are power-law fits beginning immediately after the announcement, with the corresponding
exponents Ωa(q) appearing in parentheses within the legends.
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for the three days (1275 minutes) after the announcement on Tuesday 08/21/01 at 2:15 pm (τ = 0 minutes corresponding to
T = 285 minutes). For the remaining 3 days of the trading week, the Omori law relaxation corresponding to an individual stock
(MER) is quantitatively similar to the the Omori law relaxation of the Bank sector over the final 105 minutes of the initial
trading day. We do not use the Bank sector Na(τ ) over the same 1275-minute time period for comparison because “opening
effects” occurring during the first 60 minutes of each trading day makes power-law regression of conjoined Na(τ ) problematic.
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Comparison of Omori law exponents for both volatility dynamics and volume dynamics on the day of
19 FOMC meetings during the two-year period Jan. 2001- Dec. 2002. Panels (a-d) correspond to the S&P 100 and panels(e-h)
correspond to the bank sector. The average value of Ω for the 16 scheduled FOMC meetings (excluding the 3 unannounced
meetings i = {1,4,8}) are: (a) Ωb = 0.10 ± 0.13, (b) Ωa = 0.24 ± 0.08, (c) Ωb = 0.04 ± 0.07, (d) Ωa = 0.24 ± 0.07, (e)
Ωb = 0.11 ± 0.16, (f) Ωa = 0.23 ± 0.09, (g) Ωb = 0.01 ± 0.10, (h) Ωa = 0.26 ± 0.08. The similarity in exponents for 1-
minute volatility and 1-minute cumulative volume suggest a universal underlying mechanism. Solid symbols ( and •) refer
to Ω computed from N(t). Open symbols ( and ©) refer to 〈Ω〉 computed from S individual Omori exponents Ωj , with
Sbank = 18. Note the relatively low value of Ωa and 〈Ωa〉 for unscheduled FOMC announcements i = 1 and 8, which indicates
that volatility rate following the announcement increased throughout the day.
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FIG. 8: (Color online) (a) A comparison of Ωa for 5 sectors with volatility threshold q = 3 suggests a broad universal market
response to FOMC news. The Tech sector tends to have the largest average Ωa, where large Ω values corresponds to faster
relaxation. The horizontal straight line represents the mean Ωa = 0.24 ± 0.08, averaged over all stocks in the S&P100 and all
scheduled meetings (excluding the unscheduled meetings i = {1, 4, 8}). (b) Probability density function P (x) of the variable
x ≡ xja,i = Ω
j
a,i − 〈Ωa,i〉, which correspond to individual Ω
j
a,i values centered around the average exponent 〈Ωa,i〉 of a given
meeting i. We conclude from a Z-test at the α = 0.0005 significance level that Tech sector Omori exponents are larger on
average, 〈x〉Tech > 〈x〉SP100. Hence, since larger Ω values correspond to shorter relaxation time, we find that the Tech sector
stocks responds more quickly to FOMC news, possibly as a result of relatively intense trading activity among these stocks.
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FIG. 9: (Color online) The relation between the size of the financial shock, quantified by the S&P 100 volatility Omori law
parameters 〈βb〉, 〈βa〉, 〈Ωb〉, 〈Ωa〉, and ∆(〈Ω〉) = 〈Ωa〉 − 〈Ωb〉, and the size of the FOMC news, quantified through the metrics
Θ representing market anticipation and ∆ representing market surprise. All trends are consistent with the hypothesis that a
strong anticipation of an interest rate change, and the element of surprise inherent in the FOMC decision, result in a market
perturbation that is significant in scale, and broad across the market. Linear regressions of S&P100 data (a,b) and bank
sector data (c,d) are provided for visual aide. Linear regressions that pass the ANOVA F-test (rejecting null hypothesis that
regression slope m = 0) at the α = 0.05 significance level are solid green; regressions that fail to pass the F-test at the α = 0.05
significance level are dashed red.
